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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The United States and Israel have an unusually close relationship, and this relationship is 
a major factor in Middle Eastern politics.  The concept of trust, which has only recently become 
a subject of study in the field of international politics, can be useful to fully understand the U.S.-
Israeli relationship.  There are two main theories of trust in international relations: the rationalist 
approach and the binding approach.  The rationalist approach focuses on how the parties 
perceive their interests, and whether these interests encapsulate each-other.  The binding 
approach is more subjective, as it looks at whether the parties perceive each-other as honest and 
reliable.  This perception comes from feelings of friendship and collective identity, which is 
fostered by extensive positive interactions.  The U.S.-Israeli relationship fits well within both of 
these approaches, and there is substantial evidence that they have a trusting relationship.  The 
best way to identify a trusting relationship is to see whether the parties voluntarily accept some 
degree of vulnerability to each-other.  A look at the behaviour and policies of Israel and the 
United States reveals several instances of accepted vulnerability, particularly on the American 
side.  This evidence, interpreted in light of the two main approaches to trust, shows that the two 
states have a trusting relationship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The study of trust in international politics is relatively new, and little has been 
written about it yet.
1
  As recently as 1997, Deborah Welch Larson noted that there was no theory 
of trust in international relations.
2
  However, the last few years have seen a sharp increase in 
interest for this topic.  Several authors have come to recognize that although “trust is elusive, 
both conceptually and in the games nations play,” it is a central element of social life, including 
among states.
3
  It is therefore a useful concept to understand at least some international 
relationships. 
As could be expected, there have been attempts to look at several international 
relationships through the concepts of trust and trust-building.  These include, among other 
examples: the end of the Cold War,
4
 European cooperation,
5
 the Oslo peace process,
6
 the 
rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s,
7
 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
                                                 
1
 Jan Ruzicka & Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,” International Affairs, Vol.86:1 (January 2010), p.71 
2
 Deborah Welch Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations,” Political Psychology, 
Vol. 18/3 (September 1997), p.703 
3
 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), p.229 
4
 Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities,” pp.703-34;  Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” 
International Organization, Vol. 54/2 (Spring, 2000), pp.325-57;  Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.183-244 
5
 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust, pp.142-79 
6
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.245-51 
7
 Nicholas Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,” International Relations, Vol.23/3 
(September 2009), pp.428-45 
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Treaty.
8
  However, there have been no attempts to examine the relationship between the United 
States and Israel from the perspective of trust. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the strength and importance of the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship.  Lee Marsden refers to it as “one of the closest and most controversial relationships 
the [United States] has experienced since the end of World War II.”9  Furthermore, this 
relationship is an important factor in world politics, and in Middle Eastern politics in particular.  
Examining whether Israel and the United States have a trusting relationship not only contributes 
to understanding the concept of trust in international relations, but also adds to the understanding 
of an important international dynamic. 
The present dissertation endeavours to determine whether Israel and the United 
States have a trusting relationship.  It should be noted from the outset that this dissertation is not 
concerned with normative judgment.  It strictly looks at whether there is trust between the two 
states, not whether there ought to be.  Drawing evidence from various aspects of the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship, and guided by the principal theories of trust in international relations, this 
dissertation argues that the two states have a trusting relationship. 
The first chapter will provide an overview of the two main theories of trust:  the 
rationalist approach and the binding approach.  The third and fourth chapters will show that each 
of these approaches is consistent with the hypothesis of a trusting relationship between the 
United States and Israel.  Finally, the fifth chapter will explore various American and Israeli 
actions and policies, to assess whether they show signs of trust.  Although there are some 
                                                 
8
 Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” pp.69-85 
9
 Lee Marsden, “US-Israel Relations: A special friendship,” in John Dumbrell, and Axel Schäfer (eds.), America’s 
‘Special Relationships’ (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.191 
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exceptions, the balance of the evidence confirms that there is a high level of trust between the 
two states. 
8 
 
CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
The traditional view of trust in international relations is that it is impossible, or 
even undesirable.
10
  Scholars such as John Mearsheimer claim that “there is little room for trust 
among states,” because “any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and 
reluctant to trust them.”11  Yet, anarchy does not necessarily lead to fear and mistrust.  As 
Alexander Wendt famously put it, “Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential 
features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.”12  Even a cursory glance at the state of 
world politics shows that interactions between states vary over a wide spectrum, from war to 
friendship.
13
  This has led some scholars to study the possibility that there may, in fact, be room 
for trust among states. 
The first question, of course, is how to define trust.  Trust is an elusive concept, 
which can be understood is several different ways.
14
  The term can be used in ways ranging from 
describing the confidence that one might have that a machine will function properly, to 
describing the trust that may exist between a husband and wife.
15
 
                                                 
10
 Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World,” p.429;  Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” 
p.71 
11
 John Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions,” International Security, Vol.19:3, (Winter 
1994), p.11 
12
 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization, Vol.46/2 (Spring 1992), p.395 
13
 Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.71 
14
 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust, p.6 
15
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.229 
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Some basic aspects of a definition of trust seem to be widely agreed upon.  First, 
scholars agree that the concept of trust only makes sense in a context of uncertainty and 
vulnerability.
16
  Indeed, trust is a way to overcome uncertainty, and it would be irrelevant in a 
world of certainty.  As Diego Gambetta wrote, “trust is particularly relevant in conditions of 
ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others.”17  Trust is 
what makes social and personal relationships possible in an uncertain world, and without the 
capacity to trust one would be condemned to a constant state of paranoia.
18
 
Aside from the question of context, there also is some agreement about the 
elements that a definition of trust should include or imply. As Aaron Hoffman noted, “scholars 
agree that trust refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interests 
under the control of others. This willingness is based on a belief, for which there is some 
uncertainty, that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the 
first.”19  However, the consensus ends there.  There is no single agreed-upon definition of trust 
beyond these basic elements.
20
 
Most definitions of trust fall into one of two ways of thinking about this topic: the 
rationalist approach, or the binding approach.
21
  The rationalist approach, sometimes also called 
the predictive approach
22
 or strategic trust,
23
 sees trust as confidence in expectations.  The 
                                                 
16
 Brian Rathbun, “It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds,” 
International Theory, Vol.1:3 (2009), p.349;  Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.230 
17
 Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Diego Gambetta (ed.) Trust:Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations (Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass., USA : B. Blackwell, 1988), p.218 
18
 Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities,” p.713 
19
 Aaron Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sept. 2002), pp.376-77, and Building Trust (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2006), p.17 
20
 Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.376, and Building Trust, p.17 
21
 Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” pp.72-73 
22
 Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and Building Trust, p.20 
10 
 
binding approach, which is sometimes referred to as the fiduciary approach
24
 or as moralistic 
trust,
25
 sees trust as a judgment about the other’s integrity and character.  In other words, the 
binding approach sees trust as “confidence in expectations that others will do ‘what is right.’”26 
 
A. The Rationalist Approach to Trust 
As its very name implies, the rationalist approach sees trust as the result of 
rational calculation.  More specifically, the rationalist approach looks at the interests and 
preferences of the parties involved in a relationship, and whether these interests and preferences 
are opposed or aligned in a similar direction.  Russell Hardin describes this trust as encapsulated 
interest.
27
  A’s interest encapsulates B’s interest when it is in A’s interest to promote or preserve 
B’s interest.  This is not the same as to say that the interests of A and B are the same, but rather 
that they align in such a way that A will somehow benefit from promoting or preserving B’s 
interest.
28
 
The rationalist approach is usually explained through the use of game theory.  
Andrew Kydd, for example, contrasts the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the Assurance Game.29  Both 
players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma will be untrustworthy, because the only Nash Equilibrium of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is for both players to defect.  However, there are two possible Nash 
Equilibria in the Assurance Game: where both players defect, or where both cooperate.  
Cooperation between two players can therefore take place when both have a preference for 
                                                                                                                                                             
23
 Rathbun, “It takes all types,” pp.346-47 
24
 Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and Building Trust, p.20 
25
 Rathbun, “It takes all types,” pp.346-47 
26
 Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and Building Trust, p.20 (emphasis added) 
27
 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness” (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), pp.3-13 
28
 Ibid, p.4 
29
 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust, pp.6-12 
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cooperation, and both are aware that the other has such a preference.
30
  Kydd therefore defines 
trust as “a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own 
cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to 
returning it.”31  Kydd stresses the importance of the players’ awareness of the other’s inclination, 
since even players with a preference for cooperation will fail to cooperate if one is not certain 
about the other’s preferences.  This leads him to “think of the level of trust one actor has for 
another as the probability it assesses that the other actor is trustworthy.”32 
Followers of the rationalist approach clearly see the game’s payoff structure as 
crucial to determining whether there is trust between players.  Indeed, a central point of 
approaching the question of trust through game theory is to show how much it depends on the 
payoff structure within a relationship.  Several factors can affect this payoff structure, but one of 
the most important is whether the said relationship is an on-going, long-term one, or if it is a 
short-term, one-off matter.  A player may have more of an incentive to exploit the other – and 
more reason to fear being exploited by the other – if the relationship is a one-time deal.  On the 
other hand, when the relationship is an on-going, long term one, the “shadow of the future”33 
provides incentives for the players to be both more trusting and more trustworthy.  For this 
reason, Rathbun describes “strategic trust” as “a belief that potential partners have a self-interest 
in cooperation, generally an incentive in building or sustaining a long-term, mutually beneficial 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, p.7 
31
 Ibid, p.6 
32
 Ibid, p.8 
33
 Rathbun, “It takes all types,” p.350 
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relationship.”34  Similarly, Hardin argues that trust is typically rooted in the context of an 
ongoing relationship which is beneficial to the parties involved.
35
 
A defining feature of the rationalist approach is that it does not see states as 
ascribing any normative value to trust.
36
  It sees trust as simply the product of a cost/benefit 
analysis combined with a risk analysis.  Some authors see this as an important shortcoming of 
the rationalist approach.  Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas Wheeler, for example, write that “what this 
approach overlooks is the possibility that actors might develop trusting relationships which they 
value independently of the pay-off structure.”37  This has led them, as well as other scholars, to 
suggest that trust can best be understood through another approach. 
 
B. The Binding Approach to Trust 
The binding approach seems to provide a response to the perceived shortcomings 
of the rationalist approach.  Contrary to the latter, the binding approach incorporates a normative 
element.  As Hoffman writes in describing the binding approach (which he calls the fiduciary 
approach): “Trust involves more than predicting the behavior of others.  It includes trustors’ 
perceptions that their trustees have a responsibility to fulfill the trust placed in them even if it 
means sacrificing some of their own benefits.”38  In this view, trust is “based on beliefs about the 
honesty and integrity of potential partners.”39 
                                                 
34
 Ibid, pp.349-50 
35
 Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness,” p.4 
36
 Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.73 
37
 Ibid, p.73 
38
 Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and Building Trust, p.20 (emphasis added). 
39
 Rathbun, “It takes all types,” p.351 
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The complexities of the normative notions that are tied to the binding approach 
make it more “slippery” than the rationalist approach.40  However, the binding approach contains 
an interesting element which is wholly absent from the rationalist approach: emotion.  Guido 
Möllering points out that “by subsuming as a form of rational choice, routine behavior, or 
reflexive reinforcement, the concept is stripped of its unique explanatory power. . . Trust only 
ever enters as a meaningful construct when decisions cannot be made in a strictly calculative 
way.”41  To proponents of the binding approach, the emotional aspect is what sets trust apart 
from simply making a well-calculated bet.  This is not to say that trust is purely an emotional 
state, as it does retain some cognitive element.  But, as Booth and Wheeler point out, trust is a 
mix of feeling and rational thinking.
42
 
What, exactly, is this emotional element which defines trust?  Möllering calls it 
“leap of faith” or “suspension,” with the latter being his preferred term.43 Möllering considers 
suspension to be “the process that enables actors to deal with irreducible uncertainty and 
vulnerability.”44  It is a combination of three phenomena.  First, it includes an “as-if attitude,” 
which consists of treating uncertainty and vulnerability as unproblematic.
45
  It essentially 
consists of a socially-constructed fiction, where the trustor pretends that the future is certain.  
This fiction relies on both the trustor and the trustee, as the trustee must create an impression of 
trustworthiness in the trustor’s eyes for the “as-if attitude” to take hold.46  The second 
                                                 
40
 Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.10-11 
41
 Guido Möllering, Trust: Reason, Routine and Reflexivity (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), pp.105-6 
42
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.232 
43
 Möllering, Trust, pp.109-126 
44
 Ibid, p.110 
45
 Ibid, pp.111-15 
46
 Ibid, pp.112-13 
14 
 
phenomenon underlying suspension is “bracketing.”47  Bracketing is also a socially-constructed 
fiction, but it is one which consists of “blending out issues that actors might be aware of but 
cannot penetrate or resolve fully. . . The logic of the ‘as if’ in trust is specified further with a 
logic of ‘despite,’ ‘although,’ and ‘nevertheless’.”48  Finally, suspension requires a “will to 
believe.”49  Here, Möllering draws upon the thoughts of American psychologist and philosopher 
William James to explain that trust requires a will to believe “even when there is no conclusive 
evidence,” so long as the thing believed is a real possibility.50 
Booth and Wheeler refer to Möllering, among other authors, when they write 
about a “leap in the dark” as being a component of trust.51  They explain this idea through the use 
of examples instead of pulling apart its different components, but it seems to be similar to 
Möllering’s concept of leap of faith/suspension.  Booth and Wheeler do not stop there, however.  
Indeed, they see this “leap in the dark” as being one of four interrelated sets of attributes which 
constitute trust at the international level.  The other sets of attributes are: empathy/bonding, 
dependence/vulnerability, and integrity/reliability.
52
 
Trust requires empathy, which can be defined as “the self-conscious effort to 
share and accurately comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including his 
thoughts, feelings, perceptions.”53  This requires both the ability and the will to see things 
through the other’s eyes.  For there to be trust between two political collectives, such empathy 
                                                 
47
 Ibid, pp.115-19 
48
 Ibid, p.115 
49
 Ibid, pp.119-121 
50
 Ibid, p.119 
51
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.234 
52
 Ibid, pp.234-245 
53
 “Sympathy and Empathy,” in David Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York : 
Free Press London : Collier Macmillan, 1968), Vol.15, p.441 
15 
 
must then lead to bonding.  Bonding refers to the development of a sense of friendship and 
collective identity, something that can take much time and often does not really happen at all.
54
 
Dependence/vulnerability refers to one’s willingness to put something valued 
under another’s control, and the willingness to accept the vulnerability that this entails.55  Indeed, 
the essence of trust is that it exposes one to betrayal.  This is of particular interest because, as 
will be discussed more in depth later, the extent of this exposure can be considered a measure of 
the level of trust between two entities. 
The last set of attributes identified by Booth and Wheeler is integrity/reliability.  
These terms embrace the idea, expressed by Hollis, that trust is confidence that the trustee will 
“do what is right.”56  These terms encompass both the normative (“integrity”) and predictive 
(“reliability”) aspects of trust.57  The perception of reliability and integrity is what will make a 
trustor believe that the trustee will not betray him. 
All of these attributes are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.  For example, a 
trustee’s strong integrity and reliability makes it more likely for a trustor to take a leap of faith, 
thus making the trustor dependent and vulnerable.  If the trustee does not betray the trustor, the 
perception of integrity and reliability is strengthened, increasing the likelihood of another leap of 
faith.  Similarly, empathy and bonding can increase the perception of integrity and reliability, 
and dependence and vulnerability can increase feelings of empathy and bonding.  Of course, 
there is no guarantee that such mutually reinforcing dynamics will occur.  But when they do 
occur, the overall result is the existence of trust. 
                                                 
54
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.237-39 
55
 Ibid, p.241 
56
 Hollis, Trust Within Reason, p.10;  Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.243 
57
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.243 
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C. Identifying Trusting Relationships 
Even if one were to settle on a single definition of trust, identifying trusting 
relationships presents a challenge of its own.  The current literature provides a couple of ways to 
go about this task.  One of these was put forth by Hoffman, who argues for using a set of three 
indicators:  (1) “discretion-granting policies and decision-making data,” (2) “oversight 
indicators,” and (3) “rule indicators.”58 
The first of Hoffman’s indicators, “discretion-granting policies and decision-
making data,” refers to when a state transfers some capacity to determine political outcomes to 
another state.
59
  The second measurement, “oversight indicators,” refers to the extent to which 
states oversee the exercise of discretion they gave other states under Hoffman’s first indicator.  
The level of trust is inversely proportional to the strictness of the oversight:  there is a high level 
of trust if the trustee is given a large amount of leeway to make decisions.
60
  Finally, “rule 
indicators” refer to the types of rules which states include in treaties.  This measurement applies 
specifically to the rules which actors include in their written agreements, but it is otherwise very 
similar to Hoffman’s second indicator.  As with the oversight indicators, treaty rules which 
provide higher degrees of decision-making freedom are a sign of trust.
61
 
In contrast to Hoffman’s three indicators, Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka argue 
that the existence of trust can be determined by looking at one key criterion: the presence or 
absence of hedging strategies in a particular relationship.  According to Keating and Ruzicka, it 
                                                 
58
 Hoffman, Building Trust, pp.26-36, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.384-93 
59
 Hoffman, Building Trust, pp.26-28, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.384-87 
60
 Hoffman, Building Trust, pp.28-31, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.388-91 
61
 Hoffman, Building Trust, pp. 31-34, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.391-93 
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is meaningful to speak of a trusting relationship only when the parties abstain from adopting 
hedging strategies.
62
 
A theme common to all the definitions of trust covered above, as well as 
Hoffman’s and Ruzicka and Keating’s indicators, is vulnerability.   The more a trustor allows 
himself or herself to be vulnerable to a trustee, the more it can be said that he or she trusts the 
trustee.  This theme is what underpins Hoffman’s three indicators:  a state makes itself more 
vulnerable when it grants high levels of discretionary authority to another, when the oversight 
levels are low, or when it signs a treaty granting broad decision-making freedom to others.  
Similarly, an absence of hedging strategies leaves the trustor vulnerable.  A trusting relationship 
is therefore one where each party voluntarily accepts to make itself, or leaves itself, vulnerable to 
the other parties. 
The main key to determining whether the United States and Israel have a trusting 
relationship is to look for areas where they voluntarily accept to make themselves vulnerable to 
the other.  Trust is a matter of degree rather than a simple “yes-or-no” question, so the evidence 
may be ambiguous in some areas.  Nevertheless, if these two states accept vulnerability on a 
number of important issues, then a convincing argument can be made that they have a generally 
trusting relationship.  If, however, they tend not to accept vulnerability on any significant issues, 
it cannot be said that they trust each-other. 
Before looking at specific areas where the United States and Israel accept to make 
themselves vulnerable to each-other, it is also useful to see whether their relationship is 
consistent with either of the main theories of trust.  If either the rationalist or the binding 
                                                 
62
 Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, David Davies Memorial Institute Symposium on “Nuclear Rivalries: Prospects 
for Cooperation and Trust-Building” (Aberystwyth, 14-15 June 2011), symposium report accessed online at 
http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Aberystwyth-symposium-June-2011---Final-Report.pdf on 15 August 2011, 
pp.3-4;  podcast of Keating & Ruzicka’s presentation: http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Session-1---Moellering-
Keating-Ruzicka.mp3, 25:46 to 46:20. 
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approach would lead one to expect the United States and Israel to trust each-other, then the 
interpretation of any instance where they accept vulnerability towards each-other as a sign of 
trust is that much more likely to be correct.  Examining the relationship between the two states 
through the prisms of the rationalist and binding approaches will therefore help determine 
whether they have a trusting relationship. 
 
19 
 
CHAPTER II 
APPLYING THE RATIONALIST APPROACH TO THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
As was explained earlier, the rationalist approach requires the existence of 
“encapsulated interests” for there to be trust between two nations.  For Israel to trust the United 
States, it must perceive that it is in the United States’ interests to attend to Israel’s interests.  And 
for the United States to trust Israel, it must believe that Israel’s interests include attending to the 
United States’ interests.  To determine whether these two states can be expected to trust each-
other under the rationalist approach, we should therefore examine whether their interests are 
aligned in such a way as to qualify as encapsulated interests. 
The two states’ interests did not encapsulate each-other in the early years after 
Israel’s declaration of independence.  Although the United States was the first nation to offer de 
facto recognition to the state of Israel in 1948,
63
 the two nations were not particularly close.
64
  
Washington’s hesitance to support the Jewish state was partly due to the fear that it might 
eventually align with the Soviet Union, a fear based on the fact that much of Israel’s leadership 
came from Eastern Europe and had leftist political orientations.
65
  More importantly, certain 
American policy-makers were afraid that supporting Israel would hurt American interests by 
putting the United States in conflict with the United Kingdom and the Arab world.
66
  All in all, 
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Israel’s interests were of little weight to American policy-makers compared to access to Arab oil 
and preserving the Arab states’ loyalty against the Soviet Union.67 
This situation changed by the early 1960s, however.  As Egypt, Syria and Iraq 
turned towards the Soviet Union, the Kennedy and subsequent administrations increasingly saw 
Israel as a valuable ally.
68
  Israel’s location near the Suez Canal was seen as a strategically 
valuable situation,
69
 and its impressive victory over Soviet client states during the Six Day War 
hurt Moscow’s prestige and proved that Israel could help the United States contain Soviet 
expansion in the Middle East.
70
  Furthermore, Israel was able to provide valuable intelligence to 
the Americans, including access to various Soviet weapons captured from Arab states.
71
  
Additionally, Israel assisted the United States by sharing its training facilities, its 
counterterrorism expertise, and advanced technology developed by its defence industry.
72
 
In return, Israel benefited greatly from American economic and military 
assistance.  The first significant procurement of American weaponry to Israel occurred in 1962, 
when, in response to a large shipment of Soviet arms to Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the United States 
agreed to sell Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel.
73
  Despite a short embargo following the Six 
Day War, which delayed the delivery of Skyhawk ground attack aircraft by a few months, the 
United States provided an increasing amount of sophisticated weapons to Israel in the subsequent 
decades.
74
  Such American weapons and supplies proved vital to Israel’s survival.  This was 
                                                 
67
 Reich, The United States and Israel, p.5 
68
 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (London : Allen Lane, 2007), p.51 
69
 Schoenbaum, The United States and Israel, pp.81-82 
70
 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobby, pp.51-52 
71
 Ibid, p.52 
72
 Ibid, p.52 
73
 Reich, The United States and Israel, p.156 
74
 Ibid, pp.157-67 
21 
 
particularly true during the 1973 October War, when the United States airlifted military supplies 
to replace Israel’s heavy equipment losses and to help counter a massive Soviet airlift of arms to 
Egypt and Syria.
75
  The United States also provided a large amount of financial support to Israel:  
Israel became the largest recipient of American foreign assistance by 1974, and it would remain 
so for decades to come.
76
  This mitigated the economic burden of repeated conflicts, and helped 
Israel develop a relatively strong economy. 
The cooperation between the United States and Israel increased as the Cold War 
progressed, and both benefited from it.  From a rationalist perspective, the relationship between 
these two nations was a trusting one, inasmuch as each side surely realized that the other had a 
clear interest in on-going cooperation.  However, the United States’ interests in this relationship 
stemmed from the broader context of its competition with the Soviet Union.  Did the end of the 
Cold War change the interests of Israel and/or the United States to the point where they no 
longer encapsulate each-other?  To use more game-theoretical terminology: did the demise of the 
Soviet Union change the “payoff structure” of the U.S.-Israeli relationship in such a way as to 
make trust less likely? 
The end of the Cold War did not change Israel’s situation very much.  Its interests 
are strongly linked to its identity as the world’s sole Jewish state, born in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust, in a region which is largely hostile to it.  From the moment it declared its 
independence in 1948, Israel has had to deal with openly antagonistic neighbours and several 
wars.  Despite reaching peace agreements with Egypt (in 1979) and with Jordan (in 1994), Israel 
still has to contend with the animosity of much of the Muslim world.  Its continuing occupation 
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of the Palestinian territories is marked by frequent violence.  The Golan Heights are still the 
subject of a territorial dispute with Syria, and the Shebaa Farms are still the subject of a dispute 
with Syria and Lebanon.  As recently as 2006, cross-border raids by Hezbollah led to Israeli 
military operations in Lebanon.  Iranian leaders regularly call for Israel’s destruction.  As Zeev 
Maoz noted, some observers claim that “a fundamentally hostile environment, one that has yet to 
accept the Jewish state into the community of nations, imposed on Israel the need to become “the 
Sparta of modern times.””77  The demise of the Soviet Union has improved Israel’s situation 
slightly by depriving some of Israel’s historical enemies of their main source of weapons and 
support, but these enemies still remain. 
The end of the Cold War has therefore not significantly changed Israel’s interest 
in American support, and the United States can be confident in Israel’s desire to continue the 
close relationship which they developed.  This means that, from a rationalist perspective, one can 
expect the United States to generally trust Israel.  But should Israel be expected to trust the 
United States?  The answer to this is not as clear. 
Walt and Mearsheimer explain that “even if Israel was a valuable ally during the 
Cold War, that justification ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. . . As the Cold War receded 
into history, Israel’s declining strategic value became hard to miss.”78  They make a convincing 
case that the United States’ close relationship with Israel hurts, rather than promotes, American 
interests.
79
  The reason seems relatively straightforward:  the United States’ close connection 
with Israel complicates its relationship with the rest of the Middle East, a region in which the 
United States still has vital interests. 
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As Dennis Ross points out, “the United States has had critical interests in the 
Middle East for as long as it has been a global power.”80  Chief among these interests is access to 
the region’s vast oil resources.81  Indeed, the Middle East accounted for 29% of global petroleum 
production in 2010,
82
 and 55% of proven reserves were located there as of 2009.
83
  Given the 
American economy’s dependence on oil, successive administrations have made it clear that the 
United States regards access to oil a vital interest.
84
  Indeed, it was largely to prevent Saddam 
Hussein from gaining control over the region’s oil resources that President George H. W. Bush 
led an international coalition to war with Iraq in 1990-1991.
85
 
Israel’s share of Middle Eastern petroleum resources is negligible, so the 
overwhelming majority of those resources belong to Arab states and to Iran.
86
  It is therefore in 
the United States’ interest to cultivate good relations with the Arab world, especially the Persian 
Gulf states which have the most oil.  Washington’s close relationship with the Jewish state has 
not made this easy.  The 1973 OPEC oil embargo provides a perfect historical illustration, as it 
was explicitly aimed at countries which helped Israel during the October War.
87
  Even if the 
prospect of a new Arab oil embargo seems very unlikely today, there are other ways in which 
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Israel complicates the United States’ relationships with the rest of the region.  During the First 
Gulf War, for example, the United States had to go to great lengths to keep Israel from retaliating 
to Iraqi scud attacks, as an Israeli intervention would probably have divided the American-led 
coalition against Saddam Hussein.
88
  This led Bernard Lewis, among others, to regard Israel as a 
strategic burden during that conflict.  As he wrote shortly after the war, “whatever value Israel 
might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War, that value obviously ended when the 
Cold War itself came to a close.  The change was clearly manifested in the  Gulf  War  last year,  
when  what  the  United States  most  desired  from  Israel  was  to keep out  of  the conflict, to  
be  silent, inactive  and, as  far  as possible, invisible. . .  Israel was not an asset, but an 
irrelevance, some even said a nuisance.”89   
Another area where the United States is arguably hurt by its relationship with 
Israel is terrorism.  Walt and Mearsheimer argue that “the United States has a terrorism problem 
in good part because it has long been so supportive of Israel.”90  Indeed, support of Israel has 
been recognized as a main motivation of international terrorist attacks against the United States, 
even if other issues factor in as well.  A 2010 opinion poll among citizens of several Arab 
countries found that a full 85% of respondents had an unfavorable view of the United States, and 
77% considered it to be a threat.
91
  The same poll clearly shows that the United States’ poor 
image in the Arab world is largely due to its strong support of Israel (although the occupation of 
Iraq was also a strong factor).
92
  Similarly, research by Abdel Mahdi Abdallah found that anti-
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American sentiment among Arabs has three primary reasons: the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq, American support for a number of authoritarian Arab regimes, and “U.S. political, 
economic and military support of Israel, which enables Israel to defeat the Arabs and continue its 
occupation of their land.”93  Yet another study found that negative assessment of American 
foreign policy, which prominently includes support for Israel, is one of the main contributing 
factors of support for terrorist acts against American targets among Arabs.
94
  It should come as 
no surprise that some individuals would seek to translate this hostility into concrete acts.  And 
indeed, the 9-11 Commission Report makes clear that American support of Israel was among the 
main motivations for Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States.95 
In short, it can be said that “unconditional support for Israel is undermining 
relations with other US allies, casting doubt on America’s wisdom and moral vision, helping 
inspire a generation of anti-American extremists, and complicating US efforts to deal with a 
volatile but vital region.”96  In such circumstances, how can Israel trust that the United States 
will continue to support it?  From a rationalist perspective, it would seem quite unlikely. 
Yet this argument misses something crucial:  the role of belief and perception.  
Indeed, rationalists such as Kydd define trust as “a belief that the other side prefers mutual 
cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation.” 97  As was explained in Chapter I, this is based 
on beliefs about the trustee’s incentives towards the trustor.98  The rationalist approach is 
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consistent with Robert Jervis’ proposition that “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions 
and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images 
of others.”99  Thus, Kydd acknowledges the subjectivity of states’ preferences when he writes 
that both liberals and constructivists provide insights on these preferences, and that “a complete 
understanding of trust in international relations must integrate realist analysis of international 
strategic interaction with other theories of preference and identity formation offered by nonrealist 
theories.”100 
Rationalist authors tend to focus on the trustor’s beliefs and perceptions, but the 
trustee’s beliefs and perceptions are relevant as well, in that they shape his or her preferences and 
incentives.  There is therefore a double perception question in the rationalist approach to trust:  it 
depends on the trustor’s beliefs about the trustee’s beliefs. 
In the present case, Israel can be expected to trust the United States if it perceives 
that Washington believes that its interests continue to be aligned with Jerusalem’s.  Israel seems 
to have good reasons to believe this.  Indeed, despite arguments to the contrary put forth by a few 
authors such as Walt and Mearsheimer, most Americans believe that it actually is in their 
strategic interest to remain closely allied to Israel. 
There was a period of doubt regarding the strategic value of the American-Israeli 
alliance during the nineties, which was recognized even by Israel’s supporters within the United 
States.
101
  However, the relationship with Israel was seen to be strategically important again as 
the Soviet threat was gradually replaced by Islamic fundamentalism and so-called “rogue states” 
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such as Iraq and Iran.  Indeed, certain authors conflated Iranian terrorist attacks against Israel 
with attacks against the West in general.
102
  This line of thought became generally accepted after 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  In the aftermath of these attacks, Americans came to 
see Israel as a “partner against terror.”103  Little does it matter that Al Quaeda and the Taliban are 
quite distinct from Hamas and Hezbollah.  Despite their differences in identity, organization, 
objectives, etc., groups targeting Israel and groups targeting the United States were lumped 
together under the rubric of Islamist terrorism.  Thus, in 2002, both houses of Congress passed 
resolutions proclaiming that “the United States and Israel are now engaged in a common struggle 
against terrorism” with overwhelming majorities.104  More recently, US Secretary of Defence 
Robert Gates declared that “with the new threats and challenges our nation faces in the region, it 
is even more important to maintain and bolster our partnership [with Israel].”105  And in a 2010 
speech at the Brookings Institution, Andrew Shapiro, then Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political-Military Affairs, repeatedly stated that Israel’s security was in the United States’ 
strategic interest.
106
 
Few Americans seem to question the value of their alliance with Israel now.  Walt 
and Mearsheimer wrote an academic essay, followed by a full-length book, claiming in part that 
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Israel was a strategic liability for the United States, rather than a strategic asset.
107
  The amount 
and virulence of criticism generated by their arguments
108
 is an indication of the extent to which 
the relationship’s value is accepted.  Most Americans strongly perceive the United States 
strategic interests and Israel’s as encapsulating each-other. 
It can be safely assumed that Israeli policy-makers are aware of the United States’ 
beliefs and preferences regarding the Middle East.  As the statements cited above show, 
American policy-makers tend to express these preferences quite openly.  Furthermore, Israelis 
seems to share the belief that their interests are aligned with American strategic interests, and 
they actively promote this view in the United States.  Shortly after the 11 September attacks, for 
example, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared: “America, we are with you, because the struggle 
against terrorism is also our struggle.”109  Similarly, in a 2006 speech to Congress, Ehud Olmert 
declared that “our countries do not just share the experience and pain of terrorism, we share the 
commitment and resolve to confront the brutal terrorists that took these innocent people from 
us.”110  Many other statements made by Israeli leaders in the last ten years go towards 
reinforcing this idea.
111
  Though this idea is probably sincerely felt by most Israelis, they 
probably would not promote it so consistently if they did not feel that it resonates with 
Americans.  It is therefore safe to assume that Israeli policy-makers perceive that the United 
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States believes its interests are aligned with Israel’s.  Consequently, the existence of a trusting 
relationship between these two states would be consistent with the rationalist approach to trust. 
30 
 
CHAPTER III 
APPLYING THE BINDING APPROACH TO THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
As was explained in Chapter I, the binding approach takes into account the more 
emotional element of a trusting relationship.  As the very term “binding” implies, this approach 
rests on the idea that parties trust each-other when they feel that there is a bond between them.  
This bond occurs “when actors translate a level of empathy and sympathy into a political 
relationship characterized by positive feelings and the forging of a new collective identity.”112  
These positive feelings, and that sense of common identity, are what lead the parties to think that 
the other will do “what is right” and not betray.  In this sense, familiarity tends to breed trust.113  
Under the binding approach, therefore, one can expect to find trust in a relationship where the 
parties have frequent and positive interactions with each-other. 
This chapter will show that there is an undeniable bond between the United States 
and Israel.  Not only have these two nations had extensive contact with each other over time, 
thereby fostering a sense of familiarity, but Americans and Israelis tend to have very positive 
feelings for each-other, and there exists a definite sense of common identity between them. 
Contacts between Israel and the United States are varied and extensive.  As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the two nations have cooperated closely on military and 
security issues since the 1960s.  But they also have a deep economic relationship.  In addition to 
providing extensive aid, the United States is Israel’s principal trading partner.  Israel is a 
                                                 
112
 Booth & Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.238-39 
113
 Möllering, Trust, pp.94-95 
31 
 
relatively small market, which means that it does not rank particularly high among the United 
States’ trading partners: it was 23rd largest recipient of American exports, and the 20th largest 
source of imports for the United States in 2010.
114
  However, Israeli trade with the United States 
is quite impressive when taking account of Israel’s population.  Indeed, US exports per Israeli 
capita was approximately $1,512 in 2010.
115
  While a few countries, such as Canada or the 
Netherlands, account for more US exports per capita, Israel accounts for much more than the 
United Kingdom (about $772) or even Mexico (approximately $1,438).  Furthermore, the United 
States provides 12.3% of Israeli imports, and receives as much as 35% of Israeli exports, far 
more than any other country.
116
 
Migration between the two countries is also significant:  as of 2009, there were 
approximately 110,850 Israeli-born residents in the United States, and over 92,800 American-
born residents in Israel.
117
  Israeli immigration to the United States may seem weak in 
comparison to immigration from certain Latin American countries.
118
  However, these numbers 
must be seen in the context of Israel’s relatively small population, which is under 7.5 million.119  
Indeed, it should be noted that far more American residents were born in Israel than in any other 
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O.E.C.D. member-state, and only the United Kingdom is home to more American-born residents 
than Israel.
120
 
Tourism is also an important area of contact between Israel and the United States.  
In 2009, approximately 538,000 Americans visited Israel, by far the largest proportion of tourists 
to the Jewish state.
121
  Similarly, an average 294,000 Israeli visitors have come each year to the 
United States from 2003 to 2010.
122
  Interestingly, a majority of Israeli tourists come to the 
United States for the purpose of visiting friends and/or relatives,
123
 which is an indication of the 
familiarity between these visitors and the host country.  Furthermore, the Israeli government 
actively encourages American tourism to Israel, particularly from Evangelical Christian tour 
groups, not just as a source of income but also to solidify these groups’ support for Israel.124  
Similarly, an affiliate of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C.), a pro-Israel 
lobby organization in the United States, funds free trips to Israel for members of Congress.  The 
purpose of these trips is, in great part, to “expose [legislators] to the policy preferences and basic 
worldview of Israel’s leaders.”125  Eighty-one Congressmen were scheduled to visit Israel in 
August 2011, for example.
126
  As a result of such efforts, approximately ten percent of all 
congressional trips abroad are to Israel.
127
 
                                                 
120
 O.E.C.D., International Migration Database 
121
 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism and Accommodation Services: Visitor Arrivals by Country of 
Citizenship, accessed online at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st23_05.pdf on 9 August 2011. 
122
 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries: 
“2010 Market Profile: Israel,” accessed online at 
http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2010_Israel_Market_Profile.pdf on 9 August 2011. 
123
 U.S. Department of Commerce, “2010 Market Profile: Israel” 
124
 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobby, p.136 
125
 Ibid, p.161 
126
 Herb Keinon, “81 Congressmen to visit Israel in coming weeks,” The Jerusalem Post (8 Aug. 2011), accessed 
online at http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=232876 on 9 August 2011. 
127
 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobby, p.161 
33 
 
Given the extensive contacts between Americans and Israelis, there can be little 
doubt that they are familiar with each-other.  There is also a high level of sympathy between 
them.  A 2007 poll conducted by Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and the Anti-
Defamation League found that 64% of Israelis had a positive perception of the United States, and 
65% viewed it as a loyal ally, while only 8% had a negative view.
128
  A more recent opinion poll 
organized by the Brookings Institution found that a full 78% of Jewish Israelis
129
 hold very or 
somewhat favourable views of the United States, while only 12% have a very or somewhat 
unfavourable view.
130
  American views of Israel are similarly positive: a 2010 poll conducted by 
Zogby International found that 65% of Americans have a favourable view of Israelis.
131
  Jewish 
Americans have a particular affinity for Israel, and a full 63% of them report feeling at least 
somewhat connected with Israel.
132
  However, the high rate of favourable views towards Israel in 
the United States goes far beyond the Jewish community, which only comprises 1.7% of the 
American population.
133
 
Americans have long held positive views of Israel.  Although the U.S. 
government was ambivalent towards Israel during much of the 1950s, Israel quickly gained 
support among the American population.  One of the earliest signs of private support for the 
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young Jewish state was the fact that Americans bought $850 million worth of Israeli bonds 
between 1951 and 1967, compared to $150 million bought by Canadian, West Europeans, and 
others.
134
  The American Jewish community was a major force in this development, but public 
support for Israel extended across the American religious and political spectrum.
135
  Writing in 
1993, Schoenbaum stated that “from 1947 to the present, U.S. support for Israel has outweighed 
sympathy for Arabs by margins as large as 10:1. . .  Presented a menu of moral or other 
characteristic qualities in 1975, half the respondents identified Israelis with ‘like Americans’; 
46% with ‘friendly’; 41% with ‘peaceful’; 39% each with ‘honest’ and ‘intelligent’.”136 
The affinity between American and Israelis is, to a large extent, due to a sense of 
identification between the two people.  Both Israel and the United States are settler nations, with 
similar foundational narratives of persecuted religious minorities (Jews for Israel, Puritans for 
the United States) fleeing Europe to become fearless pioneers taming the wilderness.
137
  As an 
illustration of this identification, Schoenbaum cites an American senator who, returning from a 
trip to the Middle East in 1957, claimed that Israel was “reminiscent in many ways of the old 
American West. . .  An American can feel very much at home in Israel – that is, an American 
who loves adventure, and who realizes that our own great country was once a little nation 
wedged between the sea and the wilderness.”138  
An even more important factor of identification is the fact that Israel and the 
United States regard each-other as fellow democracies with similar values.  Lee Marsden points 
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out that “the shared ideals of freedom, liberty, democracy and ultimately prevailing through 
adversity to a peaceful future is a narrative that has become a mantra for US and Israeli 
leaders.”139  For example, US Vice-President Biden declared in 2009 that “the bond between 
Israel and the United States was forged by a shared interest in peace and security; by shared 
values (...) and a common, unyielding commitment to democracy.”140  President Obama said 
something very similar during a 2010 joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu:  “the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable.  It encompasses our 
national security interests, our strategic interests, but most importantly, the bond of two 
democracies who share a common set of values and whose people have grown closer and closer 
as time goes on.”141  This theme is also brought up by Israeli leaders.  In his recent speech to 
Congress, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared that “we stand together to defend democracy,” and 
contrasted Israel’s democratic government to the more authoritarian regimes of other Middle-
Eastern countries.
142
  His predecessor in the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, Ehud Olmert, also 
drew implicit parallels between the two democracies in his 2006 speech to Congress, where he 
recounted that his parents “immigrated to Israel to fulfil their dream of building a Jewish and 
democratic state living in peace in the land of our ancestors,” and that “We have succeeded in 
building a Jewish democratic homeland.”143  As this last example illustrates, the theme of 
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democracy is often paired with that of common settler origins into the broad narrative of “a 
pioneer nation, making the desert blossom and bringing civilization or democracy at least to a 
lawless region.”144 
The shared narratives of frontier settlement and democracy, along with the 
extensive contacts between Israel and the United States, foster a sense of closeness between the 
two nations.  But a discussion of the bonds between the two countries would be incomplete 
without mentioning the religious dimension.  Given Israel’s explicit character as a Jewish state, it 
is to be expected that Jewish Americans would have special affection for it.  That does not mean 
that American Jews will reflexively support all of Israel’s policies – on the contrary, many 
American Jews feel free to criticize Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its treatment of 
Palestinians, among many other things.
145
  However, a vast majority of them feel a special 
connection to Israel, as is reflected in the opinion poll cited earlier in this chapter.  On the Israeli 
side, the United States is greatly respected as the home of the world’s largest Jewish community, 
a community which is highly educated, prosperous, and well organized.
146
 
Like the American Jewish community, many American Christians feel a special 
attachment to Israel.  The strongest form of Christian support for Israel is found in the Christian 
Zionist movement, which sees the Jewish state as the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy.
147
  
However, American Christian sympathy for Israel goes beyond this particular movement.  As 
Bernard Reich explains: 
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“The original settlers of the United States brought their religious identity and 
concerns with them, and the Old Testament served as a guide to both history 
and daily life.  The religious faith of the Pilgrims later became a factor in 
support for Israel throughout the U.S. Christian, and especially 
fundamentalist, community.  Hebrew was a significant language of study in 
U.S. colleges and universities in their early days, and there was a religious and 
spiritual connection with the land of the Bible and its inhabitants – universally 
seen as Jews, not Arabs.”148 
The Cold War greatly bolstered the American Christian identification with Israel.  
The years immediately following Israel’s independence saw a broad Christian revival in the 
United States which, in the context of the fight against “godless Communism,” strengthened the 
identification of American Christians with Jews and Israel under the broader label of Judeo-
Christianity.
149
  Many Christian Americans thus “came to view Israelis as religious brothers, 
sharing an understanding of moral and political values in a Cold War world.”150  This view 
survived the fall of the Soviet Union, and many American Christians, particularly Evangelicals, 
still have strong sympathies for Israel.
151
 
All of these ties – economic, political, cultural and religious – closely bind the 
United States and Israel, and foster a feeling of kinship between the two nations.  Americans see 
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Israel as “a tiny extension of their nation’s own hopes and history,”152 while Israelis view the 
United States as “Israel’s closest friend.”153  This sense of close friendship – of kinship, even – 
should naturally lead each nation to be confident that the other will do “what is right.”  One 
could therefore expect the two states to have a trusting relationship according to the binding 
approach. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVIDENCE OF A TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
The previous chapters show that the relationship between the United States and 
Israel can reasonably be expected to be a trusting one.  This is definitely true under the binding 
approach, as the two states have close historical, cultural, economic, and political ties, leading to 
a strong sense of common identity.  This is also true under the rationalist approach, if one 
considers that the United States perceives its interests as being aligned with Israel’s.  But are the 
actual policies of these two states indicative of a trusting relationship?  For the most part, yes. 
As was discussed in Chapter I, voluntary acceptance of some form of 
vulnerability is evidence of trust.  If such evidence is observed in a number of different aspects 
of a relationship, this would mean that it is a generally trusting relationship.  The present chapter 
will examine some of the most important features of the U.S.-Israeli relationship to assess 
whether there is enough evidence to confirm that they have a trusting relationship. 
The field of intelligence will be discussed first, and although Israel and the United 
States are known to cooperate in this field, it is not clear that this cooperation shows much trust.  
This chapter will then discuss military cooperation between the two countries, American 
economic and military aid to Israel, and Israel’s development of nuclear weapons.  These aspects 
of the U.S.-Israeli relationship all tend to show that the United States has a high level of trust 
towards Israel, but they do not reveal much with regards to Israel’s level of trust toward the 
United States.  This illustrates a practical problem in determining the existence of trust in highly 
unequal relationships.  One detects trust by looking for instances of voluntary acceptance of 
40 
 
vulnerability.  However, this is a relationship where Israel is in a position of dependency towards 
the United States, and therefore it is already inherently vulnerable to it.  Furthermore, it is often 
difficult to determine how voluntary the actions of a much weaker party are in such an unequal 
relationship.  Despite those considerations, though, there is one issue which arguably shows that 
Jerusalem trusts Washington: dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
 
A. Intelligence cooperation 
It is sometimes said that “one of the strongest Western intelligence links is that 
between the United States and Israel.”154  The US Ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, recently 
claimed that the two states “face the same threats and therefore have built excellent cooperation 
between the two governments in the field of intelligence.”155  If true, this would be a sign of 
trust.  Intelligence falls under the category of “decision-making data” which Hoffman refers to in 
his list of trust indicators.  The state providing intelligence must be confident that it will not be 
used in a way contrary to its interests.  Any recent example of intelligence collaboration would 
be classified information, making it hard to verify how strong U.S.-Israeli intelligence 
cooperation really is today.  However, some information about past collaboration between 
American and Israeli intelligence services is available, and this history paints an ambiguous 
picture. 
Intelligence cooperation between the two states began in the early 1950s, after 
James Angleton, then the head of the C.I.A.’s counterintelligence unit, organized a meeting 
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between Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the director of the C.I.A.
156
  From then on, 
Israel passed valuable intelligence about the Soviet Union to the United States.  Much of this 
intelligence came from recent Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, who were able to 
provide Israel with a wealth of information from the other side of the Iron Curtain, information 
which often would have been extremely difficult for the United States to obtain on its own.
157
  
Israel was also willing to pass on Soviet weaponry captured during wars with its Arab 
neighbours.
158
  Among the best examples of valuable intelligence provided to the United States 
by Israeli intelligence during the Cold War was the sharing of Khrushchev’s famous 1956 speech 
denouncing Stalin’s excesses, and the sharing of a full Soviet-made Mig-21 which it obtained 
from an Iraqi defector.
159
  This cooperation continued after the end of the Cold War.  Israel 
shared intelligence with the United States during the 1991 Gulf War, provided information about 
the transfer of sensitive technology from China to Iran in 1997, and assisted the United States 
and U.N. Special Commission in their efforts to uncover Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons programs.
160
 
It is safe to say that Mossad’s provision of high quality intelligence to the C.I.A. 
“was without doubt for quid pro quo purposes.”161  Indeed, there are known examples of the 
C.I.A. providing information to Israel.  However, this reciprocation by the United States only 
took place after several years, and was not always consistent.  The C.I.A. readily provided 
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information to Israel in certain cases, but was reluctant in others.
162
  A striking example was 
reconnaissance satellite imagery:  the United States sometimes agreed to provide Israel with full 
access to such data, and at other times restricted or denied Israeli access to it.
163
  In particular, the 
C.I.A. has been unwilling to provide information regarding Arab states friendly to the United 
States.
164
 
The 1991 Gulf War provides the strongest example of the United States’ 
ambivalence towards sharing sensitive information with Israel.  Indeed, Washington provided 
only very limited access to intelligence about Iraq during that period.  Israeli requests for an 
electronic downlink to American intelligence satellites were turned down, as were requests to 
acquire U.S. aircraft identification codes to differentiate between “friend or foe” warplanes.165  
American leaders were clearly afraid that Israel would use such information to retaliate against 
Iraq’s missile attacks, something which Washington feared would unravel the U.S.-led coalition 
against Saddam Hussein.
166
  The United States’ unwillingness to make its interests vulnerable to 
Israel reveals a definite lack of trust at that particular time.  But as mentioned above, American 
intelligence cooperation has tended to be inconsistent even at other times. 
The unreliability of American intelligence-sharing has led Israel to engage in 
some hedging strategies.  One of these is espionage.  In all fairness, it is common for even 
closely allied nations to spy on each-other to at least some degree, and the C.I.A. collects 
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intelligence on even the closest American allies.
167
  Nevertheless, Israel’s efforts to spy on the 
United States are reported to be particularly aggressive, and some sources regard Israel as “the 
second most active foreign intelligence service in the United States.”168  One of the most famous 
examples is the case of Jonathan Pollard, an American naval analyst who passed on large 
quantities of classified documents to Israel during the early 1980s.
169
  More recently, in 2006, a 
U.S. Department of Defence analyst named Lawrence Franklin was sentenced to over 12 years of 
prison for disclosing classified information to an Israeli diplomat.
170
  Furthermore, the 
inconsistency with which American agencies share satellite imagery has led Israel to launch its 
own spy satellite system.  An unclassified 2007 C.I.A. report on the Israeli space reconnaissance 
effort explicitly states that it is in response to the unreliability of American intelligence-sharing 
with regards to satellite imagery.
171
  Just as the American ambivalence about sharing satellite 
intelligence shows a lack of trust, this demonstrates that Israelis do not trust the United States on 
this issue. 
Writing in 2001, Kahana argued that “cooperation between the U.S. and Israeli 
intelligence communities exists on a tit-for-tat basis, and only when it serves the interests of the 
side providing information to the other.”172  This is consistent with the rationalist approach to 
trust:  a party will share information when its interests are aligned with the other’s interests in 
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having that information.  However, there is little indication that beliefs about the other’s integrity 
have much to do with it.  This picture therefore does not fit well within the binding approach.  In 
any case, one could say that Israel and the United States trust each-other in the specific instances 
when they share intelligence, but it cannot be said that they generally trust each-other in the field 
of intelligence. 
Any conclusion on this topic can only be tentative, however.  Indeed, the secretive 
nature of intelligence means that little information is available on this topic.  This is especially 
true about recent information, which is largely unavailable to the general public.  It is therefore 
practically impossible to draw conclusions about the current state of Israeli-American 
intelligence-sharing.  Indeed, American cooperation may have increased substantially since the 
events of 11 September 2001.  On 16 January 2009, for example, the two states signed a 
memorandum of understanding on the prevention of the supply of material to terrorist groups, in 
which they agreed to share intelligence regarding the smuggling of weapons to Gaza.
173
  There 
reportedly are also high levels of intelligence-sharing about Iran,
174
 and the C.I.A. and Mossad 
are said to cooperate closely on covert efforts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.175  But recent 
information on these topics is scant and vague, which makes it impossible to reach a definite 
conclusion on whether Israel and the United States generally trust each-other with regards to 
intelligence. 
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B. Military Cooperation 
Beyond the murky world of intelligence, there is little doubt that the United States 
and Israel cooperate extensively on military and security issues.  Cooperation with regards to 
covert operations in Iran is but one illustration.  Israel and the United States also have a history 
of sharing military tactics and know-how.  For example, the two states share expertise on 
fighting terrorism, particularly within the framework of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Group 
which was created in 1996 to facilitate such exchanges.
176
  They also have conducted a large-
scale joint military exercise every two years since 2001, in an effort towards integrating their 
weapons, radars, and other systems.
177
  Such sharing of military doctrine and tactics requires a 
certain level of trust on the part of both countries, as this type of information could potentially be 
used against the one sharing it.  In other words, sharing this knowledge involves accepting a 
degree of vulnerability.  Both Israel and the United States are willing to accept this. 
The United States also maintains stockpiles of military materiel – including 
missiles, artillery ammunition, and armored vehicles – at Israeli bases for use in case of 
conflict.
178
  The initial value of this equipment was $100 million, but it increased over time to 
$800 million by 2010.
179
  The material remains property of the United States, but the Israel 
Defense Forces may use it in case of emergency – as they did, with prior American permission, 
during the 2006 war in Lebanon.
180
  This arrangement is not unique.  Indeed, the United States 
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maintains similar stockpiles in other allied countries, such as South Korea.
181
  Nevertheless, it 
takes trust for the United States to store a substantial amount of material, which it might need in 
case of crisis, in the hands another country.  With such an arrangement, the United States makes 
itself vulnerable to having the stockpiled material stolen or misused by the host country.  
Maintaining these stockpiles in Israel is therefore a strong indication of trust. 
Yet the extent of U.S.-Israeli military cooperation is not limited to sharing best 
practices and storing military supplies.  Perhaps the most important aspect of this cooperation is 
the high degree of collaboration on military technology development.  Indeed, the two states 
frequently participate in joint research and development programs.
182
  Current joint projects 
include several important missile defense systems such as the Arrow anti-ballistic missiles, the 
Iron Dome system to intercept Palestinian and Iranian-made rockets and mortar rounds, and a 
defense against long-range rockets and cruise missiles called David’s Sling.183 
Although those are joint projects, which implies technology sharing from both 
sides, these arrangements really should be seen as a form of technology transfer from the United 
States to Israel.  Indeed, American military aid plays a crucial role in this cooperation, as these 
joint research and development projects are mostly financed by the United States.
184
  While a 
significant amount of work is done by Israeli researchers, the United States is absolutely in a 
position to conduct this research by itself if it wanted to.  Israel, by contrast, would probably not 
be able to develop many of these weapon systems without American assistance.
185
 
                                                 
181
 Amos Harel, “U.S. to store $800m in military gear in Israel,” Haaretz  (11 January 2010), accessed at 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/u-s-to-store-800m-in-military-gear-in-israel-1.261162 on 28 August 
2011. 
182
 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobby, p.32 
183
 Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” pp.8-10 
184
 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobby, p.32 
185
 Ibid 
47 
 
The United States has therefore helped Israel become one of the most 
technologically advanced military powers in the world.
186
  The fact that the United States would 
help another country develop its armed forces to such an extent is a sign of trust, as it rests on the 
belief that these armed forces will not be used against its interests.  This idea will come up again 
in the section on American aid to Israel, further below. 
Technology transfer is also a sign of trust in that it rests on the belief that Israel 
will not then convey this technology to a third party which may be hostile to the United States.  
There are limits to the Americans’ trust of Israel with regards to this.  Indeed, there have been 
some tensions between the two states over Israeli attempts to sell sensitive technology to other 
nations, particularly China.
187
  This issue led a 2005 bilateral agreement mandating Israeli 
consultation with the American government on sensitive arms transfers to third parties.
188
  So 
while the United States trusts Israel enough to share and co-develop sensitive technology with it, 
a mechanism was put in place to hedge against the possibility that Israel would pass this 
technology on in ways that would be adverse to American interests.  This shows that there are 
some limits to how much the United States trusts Israel, given Israeli interest in selling sensitive 
technology to other nations. 
 
C. American Foreign Aid to Israel 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the U.S.-Israel relationship is the 
considerable amount of aid which Israel has received from the United States.  American military 
aid has helped transform Israel into one of the world’s most advanced military powers, and 
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American economic aid has substantially subsidized the Israeli economy over the last several 
decades.
189
  Overall, Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign assistance 
since World War II, and it was the largest annual recipient of American foreign aid from 1976 
until it was supplanted by Iraq in 2004.
190
 
Providing aid can often be seen as a sign of trust.  This is certainly true at the 
level of individuals:  one who gives money to charity, for example, does so because he or she 
trusts that this money will be used for the advertised purposes as opposed to lining the pockets of 
the charity’s leaders.  Similarly, a state will provide aid with a specific purpose in mind, such as 
economic development or as an incentive for cooperation on some other issue.  The donor state 
gives with the hope that the resources in question will be used for their intended purpose, or at 
least not used in a way contrary to the donor’s interests.  In this sense, the donor state makes 
itself vulnerable to betrayal as soon as the resources leave its control and come into the 
recipient’s hands.  This acceptance of the possibility of betrayal is an indication of trust. 
 States can hedge against the possibility that their aid will be misused.  One of the 
strongest hedges against misuse of aid would be to provide it without giving the recipient 
country’s government any control over it.  For example, food aid can be distributed directly to a 
population in need, bypassing government authorities which may steal or waste part of it.  The 
American foreign aid agency, USAID, does this in parts of West Africa, for example.
191
  
Another, less drastic, hedging mechanism consists in monitoring the recipient’s use of foreign 
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aid, a practice which is a standard USAID policy.
192
  In any case, as was discussed in Chapter I, 
the level of hedging is inversely proportional to the level of trust.  Giving a high level of 
unsupervised control over a substantial amount of aid is a strong sign of trust. 
With this in mind, it is extremely interesting to look at American aid to Israel.  
This aid is multifaceted, with a broad array of military and economic grants, loans and assistance 
programs.
193
  This section will first examine civilian economic aid, and then discuss military 
assistance. 
 
1) Economic Aid 
The United States provided a limited amount of economic aid to Israel throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, mostly in the form of loans.
194
  This aid increased significantly after 1971, 
and it also changed in nature.  Whereas early American aid mostly consisted of project aid, 
Export Import Bank loans and some relatively minor other programs, it changed to include a 
broader Commodity Import Program, as well as increased loans, Jewish refugee resettlement 
grants, and substantial loan guarantees.
195
  Contrary to most other recipients of American foreign 
assistance, who normally receive it in instalments, all U.S. foreign aid earmarked for Israel is 
delivered within the first thirty days of the fiscal year.
196
  In other words, the United States is 
willing to grant Israel full control over the funds allocated to it much sooner than other recipients 
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of U.S. aid.  This is just one out of several examples of American willingness to give Israel high 
levels of control over its aid allotment. 
The Commodity Import Program, which soon became the main vehicle for non-
military American aid, was replaced by mostly unconditional cash grants after 1979.
197
  These 
grants ended in 2008, as Israel’s economy has developed to the point where it is considered a 
fully industrialized nation and no longer needs such aid.
198
  But until that year, Israel received a 
considerable amount of economic grant aid, with an average $827.49 million per year between 
1972 and 2007.
199
  More importantly, Israel obtained full control over these sums, with very little 
American oversight.  In fact, as Walt and Mearsheimer point out, Israel was the only recipient of 
U.S. economic aid that did not have to account for how that aid was spent.
200
 
Loan guarantees are now the principal vehicle for non-military American aid to 
Israel.
201
  Since 1972, the United States has given loan guarantees to help Israel deal with 
housing shortages, the absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, 
and its economic recovery after a 2000-2003 recession caused by the Second Palestinian 
Intifada.
202
  Such loan guarantees allow Israel to borrow funds from commercial sources at 
significantly lower interest rates than it otherwise would be able to.  Contrary to the economic 
aid grants, there are some conditions attached to the American loan guarantees.  Under a 2009 
agreement, the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group establishes budgetary 
benchmarks for Israel, such as deficit and spending caps, and the United States must give written 
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determination of the realization (or waiver) of these benchmarks.
203
  Meeting these benchmarks 
is not an insignificant condition, but it is somewhat diluted by the fact that the benchmarks are 
set by a joint American-Israeli group.  This gives Israel some influence over the conditions it 
needs to meet to qualify for the loan guarantees.  Another constraint on Israel’s use of these loan 
guarantees has to do with its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza.  The United States 
opposes the construction of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Territories, and American 
legislation requires that loan guarantees be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel 
spends on settlements.
204
  Thus, the $3 billion loan guarantees for 2003 were reduced by $289.5 
million because Israel continued to build such settlements.
205
  This is a rather minor constraint, 
though.  As Mearsheimer and Walt argue, “this reduction is not as severe as it may sound. . . as it 
involved no decrease in direct U.S. aid and merely forced Israel to pay a slightly higher interest 
rate on a small portion of the borrowed fund.”206  Thus, the relatively limited conditions attached 
to these loan guarantees do not significantly change the perception that Israel has close to full 
discretion over how to use the American economic assistance it gets.  The fact that the United 
States is willing to provide so much economic aid under these conditions shows a strong level of 
trust. 
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2) Military Aid 
Israel has received a substantial amount of American economic aid over the years, 
but it has received even higher levels of military aid.  American military grants to Israel came to 
a total of more than $61 billion from 1948 to 2010, over fifty percent of all U.S. aid to Israel 
during that time period.
207
  The proportion of military to economic aid has recently grown even 
larger.  In 2007, just as the economic aid grants were being phased out, the United States 
announced that it would increase military assistance to Israel by $30 billion over the following 
decade.
208
 
American military aid aims to help Israel maintain a “qualitative military edge” 
over other military forces in the region.
209
  Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military 
Affairs Dan Shapiro explained in 2010 that “the cornerstone of our security commitment to Israel 
has been an assurance that the United States would help Israel uphold its qualitative military 
edge. . .  Israel’s QME is its ability to counter and defeat credible military threats from any 
individual state, coalition of states, or non-state actor, while sustaining minimal damages or 
casualties.”210  This commitment to Israel’s “Q.M.E.” has its roots in the 1968 sale of Phantom 
jets, then one of the United States’ most sophisticated warplanes, which was partly encouraged 
by a U.S. Senate resolution calling on the President to take the necessary steps to “provide Israel 
with an adequate deterrent force,” counteract new Arab weaponry, and replace losses from the 
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Six Day War.
211
  Successive American administrations have confirmed this commitment 
repeatedly since then, and Congress translated this policy into law with the Naval Vessel 
Transfer Act of 2008.
212
 
The very fact that the United States provides substantial assistance in building up 
the armed forces of another nation is a sign of trust, for it indicates a belief that these armed 
forces will not be used against American interests.  It is therefore significant that Israel has 
consistently had access to the best, most advanced American weaponry.
213
  For example, Israel is 
one of the few countries scheduled to take delivery of the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter within 
the next few years.
214
 
American military aid to Israel is not completely unconditional.  According to a 
1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent agreements between the two states, 
American military equipment may only be used “to maintain internal security, for legitimate self-
defense, or to participate in United Nations collective security arrangements.”215  This has led to 
some friction between Israel and the United States, as the former has occasionally used 
American equipment in offensive actions.  Thus, the Reagan administration temporarily 
suspended shipments of new F-16 fighter jets after Israel used U.S.-made planes to bomb the 
Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak in 1981.
216
  A year later, the White House prohibited the 
export of cluster bombs to Israel for six years to protest Israel’s use of these U.S.-supplied 
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munitions against civilian targets in Lebanon.
217
  The sale of cluster bombs to Israel was again 
restricted in reaction to their use during the 2006 war in Lebanon.
218
  Nevertheless, the impact of 
such restrictions on American military aid to Israel is very limited.  Like the loan guarantee 
reductions to protest settlement construction, these restrictions seem more symbolic than 
substantive.  They do not change the overall fact that the United States is very willing to help 
Israel develop a strong military force. 
Several specific aspects of American military assistance reinforce the perception 
that the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel.  The main component of American 
military aid is the payment of Foreign Military Financing (F.M.F.), which Israel receives in a 
lump sum during the first month of each fiscal year.
219
  Like the early payment of economic aid 
grants mentioned earlier, this gives Israel immediate control over each yearly package of aid. 
Israel is also the only nation for which military procurement contracts worth less than $500,000 
are exempt from prior review by American authorities.
220
  This shows that the United States does 
not feel that it has to impose strict oversight over how Israel uses its military aid. 
Normal American policy requires recipients of F.M.F. to spend these funds on 
American equipment.  Israel is the sole exception to this rule, and it is allowed to spend a 
substantial amount of its F.M.F. on Israeli equipment.
221
  Again, this gives Israel more discretion 
on the use of these funds.  It also helps maintain and develop Israel’s own defense industry.  
Interestingly, Israel’s domestic military industry partly grew out of a desire to reduce 
dependency on outside suppliers, particularly the United States.  A healthy domestic defense 
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industry was seen as a hedge against the possibility that the United States would stop providing 
military equipment to Israel.
222
  This shows that Israel does not completely trust the United 
States – or anyone, for that matter – to always provide military assistance. 
One should not read too much into this hedge, however, as it is rather weak 
compared to the extent of Israeli dependence on U.S. military aid.  It would be an exaggeration 
to claim that the Jewish state distrusts the United States based on its efforts to develop a strong 
domestic arms industry.  However, it would also be an exaggeration to claim that Israel’s 
dependence on American aid is a sign of trust.  Indeed, Israel’s perceived defense needs are 
much bigger than it can afford on its own, and it has little choice but to depend on help from the 
United States.
223
  This is the case whether or not Israel has much trust for its powerful 
benefactor. 
 
D. Nuclear Weapons 
The topic of nuclear weapons can provide an interesting test for trust, given their 
tremendous destructive power.  In the present case, Israel’s attitude towards American nuclear 
weapons is largely irrelevant.  The United States developed a nuclear arsenal before the Jewish 
state even existed, and it is so much more powerful than Israel that the latter never had any 
choice but to accept the former’s nuclear status.  The reverse is not true, though.  The United 
States could have exerted more pressure on Israel to stop it from developing a nuclear capability.  
Even after Israel successfully developed nuclear weapons, the United States could have made 
more of an effort to convince Israel to reduce or limit its nuclear arsenal.  Instead, the United 
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States chose to tacitly accept Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons.  This is a strong sign of 
American trust towards Israel. 
Israel set about to develop its own nuclear energy capabilities in the 1950s, taking 
advantage of President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative and substantial technical help 
from France.
224
  Following the Suez Crisis, Israeli leaders became increasingly convinced that 
they needed to develop a military nuclear capability as well as civilian nuclear power.  In close 
collaboration with France, which also decided to develop its own nuclear weapons after the Suez 
Crisis, Israel proceeded to build a secret research reactor and reprocessing plant at Dimona.
225
  
The existence of the Dimona reactor was publicly acknowledged by Prime Minister Ben Gurion 
in 1960, but Israel never acknowledged any plan to produce nuclear weapons.
226
  It is widely 
believed that Israel has manufactured a number of nuclear weapons, although the exact number 
is an open question.
227
  The Federation of American Scientists and other organizations have 
estimated that Israel has between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads.
228
 
The American government first realized that Israel was possibly developing a 
nuclear weapon towards the end of the 1950s.
229
  The United States was officially opposed to 
military nuclear proliferation, but maintained an ambiguous stance from early on.
230
  Avner 
Cohen notes that “the Eisenhower administration had knowledge of the Dimona project as early 
as 1958-59 but did not act on it, setting the precedent that Israel’s nuclear weapons program was 
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treated as a special case.”231  The United States exerted a certain amount of pressure to ensure 
that Israel’s nuclear program was only for peaceful purposes, and was able to send inspectors to 
the Dimona site several times.
232
  But the Americans did not push very hard.  For example, they 
accepted important limits to the Dimona visits, as they were unwilling to risk a crisis over the 
issue.
233
  There were some strong-worded exchanges between Israel and the United States, 
particularly under the Kennedy administration, but the American government accepted less-than-
full compliance to their demands.
234
  Israel is thought to have succeeded in acquiring a military 
nuclear capability by 1969.
235
  It has never confirmed nor explicitly denied that it possesses 
nuclear weapons, stating only that it would not be the first Middle Eastern country to “introduce” 
nuclear weapons in the region.
236
  This ambiguous posture, which allows the United States to 
treat Israel as a de facto nuclear-weapon state without explicitly acknowledging it, seems 
satisfactory to Washington.
237
 
The United States’ tacit acknowledgement of Israel’s nuclear status contrasts 
sharply with its current policies towards Iran and North Korea.  Indeed, the United States 
explicitly considers the latter countries’ pursuit or possession of nuclear weapons as 
unacceptable, and it has deployed a wide array of diplomatic and economic sanctions to pressure 
                                                 
231
 Ibid, p.84 
232
 Ibid, pp.101-13; 153-66; 175-94 
233
 Ibid, p.193 
234
 Mordechai Gazit, “The Genesis of the US-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue,” Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol.35/3 (July 2000), pp.418-20 
235
 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp.327-29;  Schoenbaum, The United States and Israel, p.169 
236
 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp.333-38 
237
 Ibid, pp.333-38 
58 
 
them into abandoning their nuclear ambitions.
238
  There are important distinctions, of course.  
One of them is that Iran and North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (although 
North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003), whereas Israel never did.
239
  Pakistan, which is 
also a non-N.P.T. state, might therefore provide a better point of comparison.  Yet, again, the 
United States exerted much stronger pressure on Pakistan than it ever did on Israel.  Washington 
cut off military and economic aid, and imposed additional sanctions after Pakistan conducted 
nuclear tests in 1998.
240
  The United States lifted these sanctions in order to secure Pakistan’s 
cooperation in the “War on Terror” after the 11 September 2001 attacks.241  However, American 
authorities still see Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons as a cause for worry, particularly 
regarding the possibility that some of these nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of a 
terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda.
242
  By contrast, the United States does not see Israel’s 
nuclear arsenal as a cause for concern. 
If it wanted to, Israel would theoretically be able to launch a nuclear attack 
against the United States:  its Jericho III missile, which was first tested in 2008,
243
 is thought by 
some sources to have a range of up to 11,500 km,
244
 enough to reach most of the continental 
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United States.  Israel also has three submarines which are reputedly able to launch nuclear-armed 
missiles.
245
  Yet, the United States is clearly not worried about an Israeli nuclear attack.  Some 
might explain this with the concept of nuclear deterrence.  Indeed, Israel would be greatly 
deterred from ever entering into a nuclear conflict with the United States, as it would be 
completely destroyed in the space of a few minutes.  This may be part of the explanation.  Yet 
the same should be true about Iran and North Korea, nations whose nuclear ambitions clearly 
worry the United States.  There must therefore be another factor at play, and this factor is trust. 
The United States’ acceptance of Israel’s nuclear capabilities is a strong sign of 
trust.  Some efforts were made to prevent the Jewish state from developing nuclear weapons, but 
these efforts were relatively weak.  Once the Americans realized that Israel had succeeded, they 
readily accepted an ambiguous promise that Israel would not be the first Middle Eastern country 
to introduce nuclear weapons in the region, and they abandoned any further effort on this issue.  
Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity makes it unnecessary for the United States to officially 
acknowledge Israel’s nuclear status.  This is helpful to the Americans, as it allows them to “look 
the other way” about Israel’s nuclear capabilities without undermining their official stance 
against nuclear proliferation.  Notwithstanding such efforts to save appearances, however, the 
United States knows that Israel is a nuclear power and is evidently not bothered by it.  Such an 
attitude strongly suggests that the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel. 
A rationalist explanation of this trust can be found in the fact that, unless it felt it 
had no choice, Israel would be extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons in any way that may 
jeopardize its relations with its most important ally.  But the binding approach also provides a 
strong possible explanation.  As was discussed earlier, Americans perceive Israel as a fellow 
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democracy with similar values.  They are therefore quite likely to think that Israel is a 
responsible and ethical state which can be trusted with nuclear weapons.  Whatever the 
underlying reason, though, the United States’ acceptance of Israel’s nuclear capabilities is an 
important sign of trust. 
 
E. Dealing with Iran 
So far, this chapter has been much more successful at finding evidence of 
American trust towards Israel than signs of Israeli trust towards the United States.  This is due to 
a practical problem in looking at trust in highly unequal relationships.  When one party is much 
stronger than the other, or when there is a strong relationship of dependency which largely goes 
one way, it is difficult to accurately detect instances of voluntary acceptance of vulnerability.  
For one thing, the weaker/dependent party in such a relationship is inherently vulnerable to begin 
with, and it may not have many options to reduce this vulnerability.  How can that party be said 
to voluntarily accept a situation which already exists anyway, and which it can do little about?  
Israel is in such a position: it is heavily dependent upon American support if it wants to remain 
the regional power that it is, and, for now at least, it cannot significantly reduce this dependence.  
Having a nuclear arsenal does provide Israel with something of a last-option insurance policy, 
but it is of no help in conflicts such as the 2006 Lebanon War or the Palestinian Intifada.  The 
effort to build a domestic defence industry, mentioned above, was initially devised as a hedge 
against American defection, yet it depends on substantial American aid to be economically 
viable, simply displacing dependence rather than reducing it.  Israel would maybe have more 
options in a more competitive, multi-polar world, but at present, there is no world power which 
would be willing or able to provide the level of support that Israel gets from the United States.  
61 
 
Israel’s dependence to the United States is such that it actually has few opportunities to take on 
more vulnerability towards the latter.  Furthermore, instances where the weaker/dependent party 
in a highly unequal relationship actually does accept some additional vulnerability are suspect.  
Does the weaker/dependent party really accept this additional vulnerability because it trusts the 
other party, or is it because it has no choice but to submit to the other party’s demands?  For a 
state like Israel, would accepting additional vulnerability be a sign of trust, or simply a sign that 
it does not want to jeopardize its relationship with the United States?  Either could be true, and it 
is therefore very difficult to reliably differentiate situations of trust from situations of duress 
when the parties are as unequal as Israel and the United States are. 
That being said, there is one variable which can help compensate for the parties’ 
inequality when analysing a relationship for trust: the extent of the vulnerability in question.  
Even in an extremely unequal relationship, there can be a point where the level of vulnerability 
in question is so high that the weaker state would not be willing to accept it unless it deeply 
trusted the stronger state.  This consideration allows one to interpret Israel’s current policy of 
restraint towards Iran as a sign that it trusts the United States. 
Although Iran’s government claims that its current nuclear program is for purely 
civilian purposes, many believe that Tehran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon.
246
  The 
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is seen as a threat by the United States and Europe, who fear 
that it would destabilize the region and potentially allow international terrorist groups to obtain a 
nuclear weapon.
247
  Hence the many declarations from American leaders expressing the view 
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that it is “unacceptable for Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.”248  But there is no doubt that Israel 
is the most worried about the idea that Iran might obtain nuclear weapons.
249
  Iranian leaders 
have expressed extreme animosity towards Israel, as exemplified by President Ahmadinejad’s 
famous 2005 speech calling for “Israel to be wiped off the map.”250  This aggressive attitude is 
compounded by the fact that, contrary to the United States, Israel is located within the range of 
existing Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles which are probably capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads.
251
  As a result, Israelis view Iran as their arch-enemy, and would consider a nuclear-
armed Iran to be an existential threat.
252
 
Fearing that its very survival may be at stake if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, 
Israel clearly has an incentive to organize a military strike to prevent this from happening.  Israel 
has already done this against Iraq in 1981, when it bombed a nuclear reactor at Osirak to prevent 
(or at least delay) Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons.
253
  Similarly, Israel 
bombed what is thought to have been a secret nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007.
254
  Conducting a 
similar airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be substantially more complicated:  Iran is 
much more distant from Israel than Iraq or Syria, it is not certain that all Iranian nuclear facilities 
are known, those facilities which are known are spread out over several sites, and they are often 
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built underground.
255
  Yet, despite the difficulties, it may be possible for Israel to deal a strong 
military blow to Iran’s nuclear program,256 and this option seems to have been seriously 
considered in 2005
257
 and in 2008.
258
 
A military strike against Iran would probably have very negative consequences 
for the region, for the United States, and for the world economy.  Iran would certainly retaliate 
against Israeli and Western interests as hard as it could, perhaps fomenting unrest in the Middle 
East through proxy militant groups, organizing terrorist attacks against Israeli, European, or 
American targets, or shutting off the flow of oil shipping through the Straits of Hormuz.
259
  As 
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Mark Fitzpatrick explains, 
“assuming that air strikes could set back Iran’s program for a few years, those years would be 
bought at a high cost in lives, property, alliance relationships, oil prices, and regional 
stability.”260 
Given the potential consequences of a military strike against Iran, the United 
States would rather counter Tehran’s nuclear ambitions through alternative means, such as 
negotiations, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.  The American government has 
dissuaded Israel from conducting airstrikes, deflecting its requests for specialized “bunker-
busting” bombs and refusing its requests to fly over Iraq.261  Although it would obviously be 
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very difficult for Israel to launch strikes against Iran without American approval, then-Vice-
President Dick Cheney acknowledged in January 2005 that it remained a possibility.
262
  The fact 
that Israel has, to date, abstained from organizing an overt attack against Iran’s nuclear sites 
should therefore be considered a choice.  In other words, Israel is accepting a substantial level of 
vulnerability. 
This is a sign that Israel trusts the United States on this issue.  It trusts that the 
United States will make a strong and sincere effort to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions through the 
current diplomatic and economic means.  If those fail, it trusts that the United States will strike 
Iranian nuclear facilities, or at least facilitate an Israeli strike.  It is interesting to note that, 
although the United States has declined Israeli requests for specialized bombs and permission to 
fly over Iraq in 2008, it has increased intelligence-sharing with Israel about Iran.
263
  The 
American government also briefs Israeli officials about covert efforts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear 
infrastructure.
264
  These measures, which themselves indicate that the United States trusts Israel 
enough to share such sensitive information with it, are evidently aimed at reinforcing Israel’s 
trust. 
Israel’s trust of the United States on the question of Iran neatly fits the rationalist 
approach.  Indeed, Israel recognizes that the United States perceives the possibility of a nuclear-
armed Iran as a serious threat.  American and Israeli interests are therefore strongly aligned with 
regards to this issue.  This logically supports Israeli confidence that the United States will act in a 
manner which is consistent with Israeli interests.  Israel’s trust can also be explained through the 
binding approach: it trusts that the United States will do “what is right” and not betray a country 
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with which it has such close and emotional ties.  As was discussed previously, there is 
considerable support for the claim that the United States and Israel are bound by particularly 
strong ties of friendship. 
66 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
It seems clear, from the preceding analysis, that the United States trusts Israel.  
There are certain specific areas and issues where this is not true, such as certain aspects of 
intelligence-sharing, but as a general rule, the United States has a high level of trust towards 
Israel.  There is less evidence of a reciprocal attitude on the Israeli side.  This does not 
necessarily denote a lack of trust on Israel’s part.  Rather, it stems from the difficulty of 
identifying reliable evidence of trust on the part of the weaker side of a very unbalanced 
relationship.  Whereas the stronger side can open itself to additional degrees of vulnerability, this 
is not so true of the weaker side, which is already inherently vulnerable.  Yet, the issue of dealing 
with Iran’s nuclear ambitions provides one area where Israel can be seen to trust the United 
States.  It would be helpful to have more examples of Israeli trust towards the United States, but 
this is enough to reasonably say that the two states have a trusting relationship. 
This interpretation is strongly supported by the two main theories of trust.  The 
rationalist approach, which depends on the trustor’s beliefs about the trustee’s interests and 
whether they encapsulate the trustor’s interests, seems problematic.  While it clearly is in Israel’s 
interest to have a close relationship with the United States, the reverse is not so obvious.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong perception among Americans that it actually is in their 
strategic interest to support Israel.  The latter is aware of this perception and encourages it.  The 
two states therefore have grounds to believe that their interests encapsulate each-other, and that 
they each have a preference for mutual cooperation.  This belief corresponds to the rationalist 
definition of trust. 
67 
 
The binding approach supports this finding even more obviously.  Indeed, if 
feelings of friendship and collective identity tend to foster trust, then one would fully expect the 
United States and Israel to have a trusting relationship.  The two countries have strong economic, 
political, cultural and religious ties, and they clearly regard each-other as close friends.  This is a 
solid foundation for trust under the binding approach, and this trust grows further as it leads to 
yet more close interaction. 
It is hard to say that one approach is better than the other.  As Ruzicka and 
Wheeler write, “the distinction between the rationalist and the binding approach is more 
analytical than empirical,” and both are necessary to understand trust.265  In any case, trust 
between Israel and the United States is consistent with both approaches.  This, combined with 
strong evidence drawn from the states’ actual behaviour and policies, supports the view that 
Israel and the United States have a trusting relationship. 
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